Polarization Statistics 2026: How Divided Are We Really?

US ideological consistency more than doubled between 1994 and 2014 — and has widened since.

Pew found the share of Americans holding uniformly liberal or conservative views grew from roughly 10% to 21% over two decades, with the median Democrat and Republican drifting further apart. Subsequent surveys show the trend continuing into the 2020s.

Pew Research Center, "Political Polarization in the American Public" (2014).

The share of partisans with a very unfavourable view of the other party has reached historic highs.

Pew’s tracking shows that majorities in both parties now hold a very unfavourable opinion of the other — and growing shares describe opponents as immoral, dishonest or even a threat to the nation’s wellbeing. This animosity has climbed even where concrete policy gaps have narrowed.

Pew Research Center, "As Partisan Hostility Grows, Signs of Frustration With the Two-Party System" (2022).

Affective polarization — emotional dislike of the other side — has risen sharply.

Political scientists distinguish issue-based polarization from "affective" polarization: how much partisans dislike and distrust the opposing group. Iyengar and colleagues document a steep rise in this interpersonal hostility, which can grow even when voters’ actual policy positions stay moderate.

Iyengar, S. et al., "The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States," Annual Review of Political Science (2019).

Most Americans dramatically overestimate how extreme the other side is.

More in Common’s research identified a large "perception gap": partisans imagine that far more of their opponents hold extreme views than actually do. The more politically engaged and the more media a person consumes, in several measures, the worse their estimate — a striking reversal of the assumption that information reduces misunderstanding.

Yudkin, D., Hawkins, S. & Dixon, T., "The Perception Gap," More in Common (2019).

Roughly a "two-thirds" Exhausted Majority is weary of the conflict, not driving it.

More in Common’s "Hidden Tribes" study found that the loudest, most ideological wings on each end are relatively small, while a large, less vocal majority is tired of polarization and open to compromise — meaning the public is less divided than the discourse suggests.

Hawkins, S. et al., "Hidden Tribes: A Study of America’s Polarized Landscape," More in Common (2018).

Americans struggle to accurately describe what the other side actually believes.

Across More in Common’s work, partisans consistently mischaracterise opponents’ core beliefs, attributing extreme or fringe positions to the typical voter on the other side. The caricature, not the reality, is what feeds hostility.

More in Common, "The Perception Gap" (2019).

Most Americans report being exhausted by political division rather than energised by it.

Research by Krupnikov and Ryan argues that the politically obsessed are a minority; most Americans are not deeply engaged partisans but people fatigued by constant conflict — a gap between the involved few and the disengaged many.

Krupnikov, Y. & Ryan, J. B., "The Other Divide: Polarization and Disengagement in American Politics," Cambridge University Press (2022).

Cross-party marriages and close friendships have become less common.

Survey work finds growing shares of partisans who would be unhappy if a close relative married someone from the other party, and fewer reporting close friends across the divide — a sign polarization has migrated from the ballot box into homes and friendships.

Iyengar, S. et al. (2019); Pew Research Center, "Partisanship and Political Animosity" (2016).

Americans increasingly live among the like-minded.

Geographic and cultural sorting — documented by Bishop’s "Big Sort" and by ongoing PRRI and Brookings research — means more Americans are surrounded by neighbours who share their politics, reducing the everyday contact that once humanised disagreement.

Bishop, B., "The Big Sort" (2008); PRRI/Brookings sorting research.

The United States has polarized faster than most other established democracies.

Cross-national analyses using V-Dem and related data find the US an outlier among wealthy democracies for the speed and depth of its affective polarization over recent decades, while some peer democracies have polarized less or even de-polarized.

Boxell, L., Gentzkow, M. & Shapiro, J. M., "Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization," NBER / Review of Economics and Statistics (2022); V-Dem Institute data.

1. Pew Research Center, "Political Polarization in the American Public" (2014).
2. Pew Research Center, "As Partisan Hostility Grows…" (2022).
3. Pew Research Center, "Partisanship and Political Animosity" (2016).
4. Iyengar, S. et al., "The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States," Annual Review of Political Science 22 (2019).
5. Hawkins, S. et al., "Hidden Tribes," More in Common (2018).
6. Yudkin, D., Hawkins, S. & Dixon, T., "The Perception Gap," More in Common (2019).
7. Krupnikov, Y. & Ryan, J. B., "The Other Divide," Cambridge University Press (2022).
8. Bishop, B., "The Big Sort," Houghton Mifflin (2008); PRRI/Brookings research.
9. Boxell, L., Gentzkow, M. & Shapiro, J. M., "Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization," NBER (2022); V-Dem Institute.

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